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BRIDGING THE GAP
Religious Community
and Declension in
Eighteenth-Century
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
Katherine Carte Engel

he Moravian town of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, declined
r/ precipitously in the years between the Revolutionary War
V
y and the beginning of the nineteenth century. Its population
dropped dramatically as young people left home to find new opportuni
ties, and, to some, its sense of communal purpose declined as well.
This once energetic and united community limped toward the future,
perhaps even aware that its greatest achievements—some of thelargest
stone buildings on the eastern seaboard, British North America's first
mechanical publicwaterworks, successful efforts to Christianize native
Americans, the largest communitarian settlement in colonial Amer
ica—^were allin the past. Most of the town's chroniclers have preferred
to gloss over this trying period between the end of the Revolution and
the opening of Bethlehem to non-Moravian residents in 1844, but
those who do write about it paint a picture of a community in disarray.
Falling population,mounting debts, and internal dissent provide ample
evidence of a town that was down on its luck. The young mpn
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members of the Single Brethren's Choir, "[became] such a behavior
problem," concludes historian Beverly Smaby, "that some among them
dismrbed the services in the new church across the street with their
rowdiness—^which also meant they were not attending them." Gillian
lindt GolUn similarly described a "system that had lost its raison
d'etre," while Joseph Levering, the author of a massive study on the
town published in 1903, lamented that the "old heroic days of
Bethlehem were a thing of the past, never to return."
To make sense of this story and to explain why such a vibrant
religious community fell upon hard times, religious historians have
turned to one of the most powerful and persistent tools in their kit, that
of declension. This deceptively simple argument, first articulated by
Perry Miller, is applied to a cohesive religious community undermined
by the growth of an economically motivated individualism. Created to
explain the deterioration of Puritan principles and community cohesion
across the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Miller's thesis
draws on the theories of Max Weber and neatly connects economic
growth with religious decline, or, in Miller's words, "how economics
might dilute religion." Reams of contemporary sermons and laments
from colonial ministers shore up the foundation of thisidea, suggesting
that religious decline in the face of economic growth is not merely a
useful interpretive construct, but rather was a widely shared concern at
the time. No less a figure than Methodist John Wesley wrote in 1789
that he feared "wherever riches have increased, the essence of religion
has decreased in the same proportion." This concise and powerful
argument seems to offer such obvious explanatory power that it has
been elevated to the status of a "model," a portable argument whose
fundamental truth is assumed whenever its essential elements—a once
unified religious society now in decline amidst a vibrant economic
situation—^are present.'

' Any historiography of declension must begin with Perry Miller's JV«»' England Mind: From
Colony to Province (Cambridge; Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1953). Quotation
at 44. For further statements of economics as the causal force behind the decline, see 49 and
51. Miller draws on the highly influential and controversial ideas of Max Weber's The Protestant
Ethic and theSpirit ofCi^italismyToicotxPaxioas, translator (London:Routledge,1992, originally
published 1930). Quotation from John Wesley appears on 175. As is perhaps unsurprising
for an idea that has spread far beyond its writer's initial intent. Miller's work has often been
oversimplified or misinterpreted. For a Miller apologia, see Francis T. Butts, "The Myth of
Perry Miller," American HistoricalPeview 87 (1982): 665-94.
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This central analysis of the influence of economic growth on
religion has persisted even as the more general idea of community
disintegration, often short-handed into the term "declension," has
spread far beyond that narrow realm.^ The construct has become both
amorphous and ubiquitous, even as it has endured decades of wide-

In early American scholarship, the idea of dedension has had a long and varied career since
it appeared in Miller's work. Much of this discussion reaches beyond the influence of
economic individualism on religious community, as Miller's own effort initially did. See, for
example, Kenneth A. Lockridge, ANov England Tonm:The First Hundred Years (New York: W
W. Norton, 1970); and Richard L. Bushman, From Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social
Order in ConnecHcut, 1690-1765 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967).
The concept of decline played a considerable role in the so-called "transition debate,"
especially when that scholarship focused on the loss of a "moral economy." For a recent
appraisal of this work, see Naomi R. Lamoreaux,"Rethinking theTransition to Capitalism in
the Early American
Journal of American Histoiy 90 (2003): 437-61. See alsoJames
A. Henretta, "Families and Farms: Mentalite in Pre-Industrial America," William and Maty
Quarterly, 3*^ Series, 35 (1978): 3-32; and James A. Henretta, The Oripns of American Cc^itaBsm:
Collected Essays (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1991). Christopher Clark offers a
different interpretation of the coexistence of communal values and religion in a single
economic and social network, although he presents this cohabitation as problematic for the
survival of tradidonal values in "Household Economy, Market Exchange and the Rise of
Capitalism in the Coimecticut Valley, 1800—1860," Jijanta/ of Social History 13 (1979): 169—90;
and The Foots of PLural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1990). See also Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Centup
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,1955); and Frederick B. Tolies,Meeting
House andCounting House:TheQuaker Merchants ofColonialPhiladelphia, 1682-1765 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1948).
In scholarship on the Moravians, the idea has appeared in studies of Bethlehem and,
more recently, Salem, North Carolina. Michael Shirley makes the most direct assertion of the
position in his work when he states: "In the eni however, the greatest threat to the
community culture of the Moravians was not the corruptions of the outside world, but, rather,
the commercial success Salem enjoyed as a market town in the piedmont." From Congregation
Town to IndustrialCity: Culture and Social Change in a Southern Community (New York: New York
University Press, 1994), 30. Gillian Lindt GolBn presents a similar argument for Bethlehem
in Moraviansin Two Worlds. See also Kenneth Gardiner Hamilton,/flAa Ettwein and the Moravian
Church During the Revolutionary Period (Bethlehem, Pennsylvania: Times Publishing Company,
1940), 57. Donald Dumbaugh's survey of early American communitarian experiments is
indicative of the generally assumed version. He argues that, in addition to the strains caused
by maintaining a "largely pacifist" stance during decades of war, "Some of the handcrafters
wanted more independence in meeting consumer demands and also in keeping profits."
Ultimately, he posits that these sources of discontent, along with family pressures, led to the
abrogation of the communal system. "Communitarian Societies in Colonial America," in
Donald Pitzer, e6kot,America's CommunalUtipias (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1997), 28.
^ Declension has also become a convenient straw man, one that is sometimes invoked
dismissively to denigrate an overly simplistic narrative. See, for example, Richard Stott,
"Artisans and Capitalist Development," Journalof the Early Republic XO (1996): 257-71.
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spread attack. Historians working to shake off its persistent influence
have attacked many aspects of the argument. The most intense
battleground has been, understandably, the model's home territory of
Puritan New England. Owing to these investigarions spawned as
critiques of Miller's uniform model, we know now to questions the
uniformity of Puritan religious belief and the resistance of Puritan
leaders to capitalist innovation. We have also learned to doubt claims
of religious decline in New England's seaports. Indeed, Jon Butler has
argued that the trajectory of early American religious history was
towards institutional strength and doctrinal uniformity, throwing into
confusion the very concept of religious declension. Many of these
arguments attack the applicability of the declension model to a
particular situation, however, not its fundamental logic. After decades
of scholarship, such challenges have eroded the saUency of the
construct to current early American historiography, but have failed to
undermine the basic idea that market economies erode (or even
corrode) religious community. In this form—simultaneously more
limited than Miller's initial conception and also more portable to times
and places outside Puritan New England—the model persists.'

' Christine Heyrman demonstrates that communal and religious coherence grew rather than
declined in Commerce and Culturi: The Maritime Communities ofColonial Massachuseite, 1690-1750
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1984). Stephen Innes argues that early Puritan leaders embraced
and encouraged capitalist endeavor in Creating theCommonwealth: TheEconomic Culture ofPuritan
New England (New York: W.W Norton, 1995). Mark Peterson suggests that Puritan religious
faith demanded a high level of economicsuccess inThePtice ofAdemption: TheSpiritualEconorny
of Puritan New England (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). David D. Hall offers a
complicated version of New English religion in Worlds of Wonder, Daps of Judgment: Popular
Religjous Belief in Earlp New England (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), making a
unified trajectorydifficult. John Frederick Martin challenges the model on economic grounds
in Profits in the Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of the New England Towns in the
Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hilh University of North Carolina Press, 1991), see especially 1-5
for an alternate description of the declension model and its tenets. Robert G. Pope argues
that there was, in fact, no decline in New England, only the "maturation of a sectarian
movement" in "New England Versus the New England Mind: The Myth of Declension,"
Journal of Social History 3 (1969-70); 95-108.
Other scholars have attacked the declension model as a general framework or an
exportable (fromseventeenth-century New England) concept. MichaelZuckerman finds fault
with the chronological fluidity with which the model was applied when he comments that
studies suggesting "a passage froma self-subordinating to a self-seekingorientation place that
passage in every generation from the founding of the colonies to the tniddle of the twentieth
century." "The Fabrication of Identity in Early America," William and Maty Quarter^, 3rd
Series, 34 (1977): 183. Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole point out that declension is a
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At first glance Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, would seem an ideal place
to apply the theories of declension with regard to the erosion of
religious unity brought on by increased market engagement because the
two overlapped so neady in its history. In the early 1790s, as the
community reached a nadir, the religious town's usually unified
leadership divided over a new project designed to increase commerce
in the town; the building of a bridge across the Lehigh River. Many
saw the bridge as an opportunity literally to connect their town with
Pennsylvania's economic future. The bridge would, its supporters
hoped, increase commerce in the struggling religious enclave and help
build new commercial connections to the wider region. Bridges are
both practical and symbolic. They can ease otherwise cumbersome
transit and encourage commerce, but they also signal an opennes to be
connected to whatever world lies on the other side, good and bad.
Despite the project's widespread support, Bethlehem's principal
spiritual and political leader. BishopJohn Ettwein, saw catastrophe as
the only possible outcome of creating such a physical link to the
outside world. His objections led to subterfuge, and open strife
marked the planning of the project, shocking incidents in the town's
normally bucolic administration.
The following pages offer a brief foray into Bethlehem's history
in general and the events surrounding the Lehigh Bridge Corporation
in particular as a means to examine declension on several different
levels. First, reading the bridge crisis as an economic event allows us
geographically limited concept, in that it "fundamentally distorts the experiences of all the
colonies outside New England," and that thelarger framework was "teleological and almost
invariably laden with distortingvalue judgments." "Reconstructing British-American Colonial
History," in Green and Pole, eds., Colomal British America: Essc^s in the Nev Hisfoty ofthe Early
Modem Era (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), II. James T. L^on takes a
similar position in his essay, also included in the Greene and Pole collection. "Spatial Order,"
99-102.
For a recent historiographical appraisal of declension in the context of religious history,
see Charles L. Cohen, "The Post-Puritan Paradigm of Early American Religious History,"
WiBam ondMaryQuarterly^'S^BeriesfA (1997):695-722. JackP. Gstens'sPursmtsofHigypiness:
The SocialDeveb^mentofEarlyModemBritish Colonies and theFormation ofAmerican Cultiire((lh2cpA
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988) argues that the dedension model applies to
New England, but that neither theconcept nor the region should beconsidered normative for
the rest of the colonial experience. In a review of the work, John M. Murrin argues that
Greene had overstated dedension's influence. This exchange suggests the model's subtle
power: it continues to shape scholarship even as its opponents vasdy outnumber its
champions.
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to test the thesis that market forces caused Bethlehem's obvious
decline; the close interrogation of such a case permits the clarification
of otherwise vague, if powerful, macro-historical forces. In Bethle
hem's case, as we shall see, market innovation did not lead to religious
decline. This argument leaves the very real problem of the town's
apparent failing unanswered, however. ThuSj after establishing what
did not cause the town to fall on ill fortunes, it will then be necessary
to explore the reasons it did.

Decline is a trajectory rather than an end point, so before turning to the
events of the 1790s, a few words about Bethlehem's origins will be
helpful. If unified religious community and a shared sense of purpose
mark the "before" state of the declension model, such conditions are
easy to find in Bethlehem. The Moravians founded the town in 1741,
as part of a worldwide effort to spread the Gospel. Their energy came,
in part, from the newness of their purpose. Although the group traced
its roots to the fifteenth-century Czech reformer Jan Hus, in more
immediate terms its origins lay in the eighteenth century. In 1722, a
small group of refugees from Catholic Austria fled across the border
into Protestant Saxony, soon settling on the lands of the young pietist
Count Nicholas Ludwig von Zinzendorf. In 1727, the residents of the
newly settled town of Herrnhut experienced a spiritual awakening that
resulted in the founding of the "Renewed" Moravian church under the
count's leadership.'* The Briider^emeine, or Unitas Fratrum, as the gfoup
called itself, developed as part of the wider eighteenth-century pietist

•"John R. Weinlick, Count Zin^endoifi The Sto^ofHis Life and Leaders/)^ in the Renewed Moravian
Church (NewYork; Abingdon Press, 1956; reprinted Bethlehem:Moravian Churchin America,
1984). Dietrich Meyer, Zine^ndotf und die Herrnhuter Briiderpmeine, 1700-2000 (Gottingen:
Yandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000). The issue of whether the Moravians are more closely
rooted in the ancient Moravian Church or in Pietist Lutheranism is still open to debate. W
R. Ward addresses the question in "The Renewed Unity of the Brethren; Ancient Church,
New Sect or Interconfessional Movement?" Faith andFaction (London; Epworth Press,1993),
112-29. The best single-volume history of the Moravian church in English is J. Taylor
Hamilton and Keimeth G. Hamilton's Histo^ of the Moravian Church: The Renewed Unitas
Fratrum: 1722-1957(Bethlehem,Pennsylvania; InterprovincialBoard of the Moravian Church
in America, 1967).
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movement, which sought to revitalize the immediacy of religious
experience within Protestant circles. This wave of religious enthusiasm,
what historian W R. Ward has called the "Protestant Evangelical
Awakening," spread throughout the Atlantic world, setting off waves
of revivals and religious rebirth that, in a North American context,
included the itinerant ministry of George Whitefield and the Method
ism of John Wesley—^individuals who both had extensive contact with
the Moravians.^
The Briidergmeine found its particular driving purpose in spreading
the gospel to the "heathen," and by 1740 the Moravians had settled
missions and communities throughout the Atlantic World, from the
Netherlands to Surinam, from British North America to the Danish
West Indies, and from Labrador to Russia. Pennsylvania played a
special role in this extravagant project. William Penn's desire to found
a haven of religious freedom and economic opportunity (twin goals
that were inextricable from the colony's start in the 1680s), was, by the
mid-eighteenth century, drawing thousands of new immigrants
annually. Sizable numbers of new arrivals were German speakers, and,
as the state churches of Europe were slow to respond to the spiritual
needs of emigres, the newcomers rapidly swelled the numbers of the
"unchurched" in Pennsylvania. Zinzendorf perceived in this circum
stance a unique opportunity to organize a new religious community,
one that would cross old theological boundaries by uniting people
under an ecumenical umbrella supported by his own, radically
Christocentric faith. The presence of large. Native American commu
nities in Pennsylvania presented an additional enticement to the
Moravians, who immediately launched missions in the Hudson and
upper Delaware Valleys. Bethlehem, an exclusively Moravian commu
nity fifty-five miles north of Philadelphia, was the pivot around which
both these activities swirled. It was the spiritual and economic base for
Moravians working with Europeans, Indians, and blacks in North
America, and the West Indies.®

' W R. Ward, The Proieitant EvangeBeal Awakmng (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992); Colin Podmore,TheMoratnaminEngknd, 1728-1760 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
'Sally SchviitttyAMixedMitBitKde:The StruggleforToieratioii inColomalPennglmma (New York:
New York University Press, 1987); Aaron Foglemati, Hop^l Joum^s: German Immigration,
Settlement, and PoBtical Culture in Colonial America, 1717-1775 (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1996). Zinxendorfs early plans for Bethlehem are discussed in the
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By all accounts, Bethlehem flourished both economically and
spiritually during the 1740s and 1750s, its success due in no small
measure to its tightly organized and efficient communitarian economy.
Indeed, it is because of Bethlehem's communitarian origins that
historians have generally assumed that its later turn towards a market
system offers evidence of market-driven declension.^ Bethlehem's early
residents were members of a shared household, called the Oeconomj,
that provided for the material needs of both those in town and those
on mission. Buildings served clear communal goals; the unmarried
women and men lived, respectively, in the Single Sisters and Single
Brothers houses, buildings that combined communal dining spaces,
workshops, and dormitory-style sleeping areas. The 1749 Single
Brothers' House was an imposing four-story stone structure that
towered over the Lehigh River, helping to reinforce a monolithic image
that led some detractors to accuse the Moravians of being papists.
Kitchens were stocked with massive utensils and dishes so that
community chefs could prepare food for hundreds at a time. Town
leaders, synonymous with the leaders of the Moravian church in
Bethlehem, directed the Oeconomy, doling out work assignments, filling
vacant mission posts, and even arranging marriages. In short, being a
member of the Bethlehem community meant integrating oneself into
an all-encompassing machine directed towards the goal of supporting
Moravian religious work.®

"Pennsylvanische Testament," BUdinffsche Sammlmg, Budingen, 1744, Volume II, 189-252.
See also Peter Vogt, "Zinzendorf und die Pennsylvanischen Synoden," Unitas Fratrum 34
(1994): 5-62; and John B. Frantz, "The Awakening of Religion Among the German Settlers
in the Middle Colonies," Williamand MatyQuarter^, 3"* Series, 33 (1976): 266-88.
'This argument is put forth most clearly by Gillian Lindt Gollin, Moravians inTwo Worlds. For
a fuller exploration of Moravian communalism, see Katherine Carte Engel, "Of Heaven and
Earth: Religion and Economic Activity Among Bethlehem's Moravians, 1740-1800," Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 2003.
' There are several good histories of Bethlehem. Foremost among them are: Beverly Smaby,
The Tranrformation of Moravian Bethlehem', and Gillian Lindt Gollin, Moravians in Two Worlds.
Hellmuth Erbe's Bethlehem, PA: Eine kommunistische Herrnhuter Kolonie des 18. Jahrhunderts
(Stuttgart: Ausland und Heimat Verlag, 1929)gives a somewhat dated but useful examination
of Bethlehem's communal period. Also useful is Joseph Mortimer Levering's detailed A
Histoty of Bethlehem, Pennylvania, 1741—1892. Good recent treatments of eighteenth-century
Moravian communitiesin NorthCarolina are: Elisabeth Sommer, Serving TwoMasters: Moravian
Brethren in Germaty andMorth Carolina: 1727-1801 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
2000); Jon J. Sensbach, A Separate Canaan: The Making of an Afro-Moravian World in North
Carolina, 1763-1840 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); and Daniel
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The Moravians' devotion to Jesus and to the community's
missions stood at the center of Bethlehem's unique economic system.
The town's Erst written constitution, the Brotherly Agreement of1754,
reminded that "It should at no point be forgotten that BethlehemNazareth were established for no other purpose than to be able to give
a hand to the work of the Savior not only in Pennsylvania but every
where in America, etc." The next sentence clarified that giving "a hand
to the work of the Savior" meant, in addition to the missionary work,
living God-centered and mutually supportive lives from cradle to grave.
The first article then continued with an explicit declaration of
communalism: "Yet something further is also here intended. That is
to say, we have become one with each other, that we each, according
to the talent and skUl that was granted to him by the Lord, wiU be
faithful and diligent, so that we can be helpful, when and where the
Savior needs us[.]"' Communal religious observance tied individual
members of the town, and of thehxgetBrudergemine,into a single unity.
Daily prayers, sermons, and singing services [singstunden\ combined with
other rituals—holidays, baptisms, marriages, and funerals—to create a
deeply spiritual tone of life in town. As Craig Atwood has recently re
marked, Bethlehem "was the headquarters of Zinzendorf s understand
ing that the sacred and secular dimensions of life should be joined in
the daily union with Christ, the wounded Bridegroom."'"
A shared sense of purpose,a strong authority structure, and access
to European capital all helped Bethlehem flourish rapidly and enabled
the community to embark on a series of ambitious projects. Within
only a fewyears, the Moravians had turned the backcountry crossroads
into an imposing town housing hundreds of people. Beyond the
town's boundaries, the missionaries' energy matched that of those who
remained behind in Bethlehem. By the mid-1750s, missions to the

Thorp, The Moravian Communitf in Cotonial North CaroHna: TluraBsm on the Southern Frontier
(Knoxville: University ofTennessee Press, 1989). For a catalog of the equipment in Moravian
kitchens, see the "Inventarium der Mobilien in Bethlehem," 1758, Moravian Archives,
Bethlehem (hereafter MAB).
' This translation is taken from Craig Atwood's "Blood, Sex, and Death: Life and Liturgy in
Zinzendorf s Bethlehem," Ph.D Dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1995, 127.
I have replaced his translation of the word "economy"with the original.
For a depiction of Bethlehem's theology and ritual life during the communal period, see
Atwood's Communis of the Cross: Moravian Piety in Colonial Bethlehem (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004).
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Indians had been established at the towns of Shecomeco, Pachgatgoch,
Shamokin, and Gnadenhiitten. Itinerant preachers traveled widely in
Pennsylvania and the surrounding areas, preaching to European
communities and organi2ing the so-called "dty and country congrega
tions," communities of Moravians who had not chosen to live in the
Bethlehem enclave. Finally, in their most dramatic project, during the
1750s the group (led by those in Europe) purchased and settled the
enormous Wachovia tract in North Carolina, one hundred thousand
acres on which a series of towns quickly took root.
The starting point from which Bethlehem declined was a high one
by any measure of religious commitment. The congregants who lived
in the town dedicated their time and labor wholly to the church's work,
and they gave over such basic and personal decisions as whom to marry
and what trade to pursue to church authorities. The community was
so tightly organized that the opinions of the individuals, even of key
leaders, often disappear from town records, scores of volumes that are
marked by uniformly bland, passive constructions stating simple
conclusions. One June 1754 session of the Community Council
recorded succincdy that "Brother and Sister Graff wiU move to
Nazareth, in order to take charge of the Nursery from day to day,"
without making any mention of whether the Graffs desired such a
move in the first place. The community's philosophy of governance
became clear at the end of that session, however, when the secretary
bluntly recorded: "One expects nothing other than that all Brothers
and Sisters wiU be notified of what is contained here, will understand
it with love, and wiU lay it before the Savior. Otherwise, [they will
register their opinion] either by mouth publicly or privately, as they
prefer, if they here or there find something to mention." Under the
guise of such abstract administration, people (sometimes as families but
also as individuals) moved between settlements and continents,
buildings were built, mortgages obtained, marriages and mission posts
decided upon, and, with extreme rarity, expulsions decreed and
accomplished. In short, unity of purpose and community cohesion
dominated Bethlehem during its early decades."
" "Geschw. Graffs werden nach Nazareth ziehen, um sich sonderl. der Nursery von Tag zu
Tag anzunehmen." "Man erwartet nichts anders, als daBalle geschw. was ihnen hier notificirt
wird, in liebe auffafien u. dem Hid. vorlegen werden. Ubrigens aber sich schrifftl. oder
Mundlich offentl. oder privatim melden wie es ihnen beliebt, wenn sie hier oder da was zu
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The route down from such heights was steep. Bethlehem's
economy had been unique in the Moravian system. When the larger
church fell on hard times, the accounting and logistical difficulties of
maintaining such a large and cumbersome communal household
seemed unnecessary to administrators. Bethlehem's communitarian
system was therefore abrogated in 1761, on the directive of Moravians
in Germany. The miore dramatic changes, however, occurred outside
the Moravian fold. The frontier (at least around Bethlehem) had been
"tamed" by years of raciali2ed warfare that pushed the province's
Native inhabitants westward, the United States had won its independ
ence, and Pennsylvania had become a state. By the early 1790s, a new
federal constitution offered a path towards stability, but war in Europe
and economic transformation in America continued to challenge the
new nation. Nor had the era of political ferment truly ended; Bethle
hem's neighbors protested new taxes and new policies they viewed as
unfair. When the Bethlehem congregation celebrated its fiftieth
anniversary in 1792 it had much to commemorate, but the i^estone
also indicated how much had changed. "Who would think. Bishop
Ettwein mused, "that in the year 1740, here and the whole [region]
north of us was wild, with here and there only a lifde Indian village, and
now nigh-on 200 miles past us, straight north, is all settled.
Bethlehem weathered these transitions, but it could not keep up
with the frantic pace of change unfolding around it. Demographics,
easier to measure than community energy, paint a clear picture. After
briefly spiking to over 1,000 residents during the French and Indian
War, Bethlehem's population had setded to around 600 by 1770, and
there it remained into the nineteenth century. During this same period,
the population of British America (and Pennsylvania) nearly doubled.
Particularly hard hit, the Single Brethren's Choir of Bethlehem, the core
of the labor force, declined from 120 members in 1776 to only 43 in

erinnein finden." Gemein Rath Protocol!,June 30,1754, MAB.
"Wer soUte denken, daB Ao. 1740 hier und die ganae Fork und North von uns eine pure
Wiiste und dicker Busche war, wo nur hie und da ein Indianer-Dorflein war, und nun wol bey
200 Meilen hinter uns, grade Norden,gesettelt ist." "KurzeHistorische Nachricht vom ersten
Anfange des Gemeinorts Bethlehem," Gemein Nachrichten, 1792, MAB. For the
circumstances surrounding the end of Bethlehem's communal economy, see Engel, "Of
Heaven and Earth," chapter 3. For resistance in rural Pennsylvania, see Terry Bouton, "A
Road Closed:Rural Instirgency in Post-IndependenceVem&yWiWSi" Journaloj^erican History
87 (2000); 855-87.
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1799. In one year alone, 1793, that group lost twenty members, nine
of whom left the Moravian church altogether. There were other signs
of change and decline in Bethlehem as well. The church struggled to
maintain the same level of income that it had enjoyed during previous
decades, as more and more businesses were sold off, went into the red,
or simply closed down. By the 1790s, even the town's principal
shops—the store, tannery, and dye house—-began to experience
unprofitable years.'^ Amidst a nation deep in the throes of often
painful new beginnings, Bethlehem suffered through an era of decline.

Bishop John Ettwein knew when he returned home to Bethlehem on
9 January 1792, after a short trip to Newjersey, that he was not coming
to the town he had first encountered in 1754. He nevertheless believed
himself to be firmly in control of a place he had ushered through the
trauma of the Revolutionary War and governed—often autocrati
cally—for nearly a quarter of a century. To his surprise, he arrived
home to find what he considered a great betrayal. Since the preceding
September, town residents had been contemplating building a bridge
over the Lehigh River in order to connect Bethlehem more closely to
Philadelphia, New York, and the nearby Saucon Valley; the project
would also place the town within easy reach of travelers on a newlyplanned state road between Philadelphia and the Wyoming Valley.
Ettwein had opposed the bridge from the start, and he had used his
influence as Bethlehem's leader to table the venture permanently, or so
he thought. The remainder of Bethlehem's leading citizens disagreed
with Ettwein over the viability of the plan. They, "the project makers"
as he called them, "made use of the opportunity" of his absence in
New Jersey to reopen the topic. During the first Gemein Rath (or
Community Council) of 1792, someone gave a "slip of paper, without
names" to the Council, requesting it bring the matter of the bridge back
into consideration. The Council did just that, appealing for opinions

"Beverly Smaby has traced Bethlehem's demographic history in The Tmtirformaiioti ofMoravian
Bethlehem. Single Brethren's Diary, especially 1793 annual summary; Annual Extracts,
Bethlehem Diacony, 1775-1800; Protocol des Aufseher Collegium, 1788-1797, MAB.
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figure 1: Johannes Ettwein (1721-1802) Unitaetsarchiv, GS.277.
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Figure 2: 1812 View of Bethlehem, including the 1794 bridge.
Moravian Archives, Bethlehem.
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from the community for and against the venture and setting the stage
for a final decision at their next meeting, two weeks hence. This
anonymous (officially, at least), extra-procedural action defied Bethle
hem's traditional authority structures and explicitly circumvented one
of the church's most esteemed members. Without Ettwein's opposi
tion, without even his presence, the issue had moved forward. Ettwein
responded angrily when he learned of these events, writing peevishly
that the would "remain outside" of discussions on the subject from
that point on. In other words, if the town would not heed his
leadership on this issue, it would be deprived of his guidance entirely.*'*
When the Gemein Rathreopened deliberationsin mid-January 1792,
the bridge's proponents repeated arguments they had been making
since the bridge had first been proposed the preceding fall: that it
would encourage commerce and help the town's economy. The
College of Overseers, another of the town's governing councils, had
recorded in September 1791 that "from every perspective it would be
beneficial if the building of a bridge over the Lehigh would be under
taken." They saw it as protecting Bethlehem's competitive edge in the
growing backcountry Pennsylvania market and worried that one
would lose aU travel through here" if a bridge across the Lehigh were
built elsewhere, a development that would be "to the great disadvan
tage of the trades in Bethlehem." Indeed, that the bridge might be a
shot in the arm for the town's economy seemed a common vision for
all who supported the project. Peter Jungman, a grist miller, wrote that
he "looked on [the bridge] as a very fine project and very useful for
Bethlehem." For local residents, a bridge would be preferable to the
existing ferry, he continued, since ferry costs sometimes equaled or
exceeded the cost of the grain brought over on it. John Heckewelder,
one of the Moravians' most prominent missionaries, noted that the
bridge would "make the market better, and probably cheaper."
Moreover, he continued, the bridge would "draw travelers here, and
'•* "Mit dem Verbindungs-kelch, der Gelegenheit bedienten sich die projecten macher, einer
gab an Br. Klingsohr einen Zettel ohne Namen, darinn gebeten wurde die Bruder wegen dem
Briicke bau zu horen, der wurde angenommen, u. so gleich geordnet," Ettwein Papers (EP)
#1311; Proposals zum bau einer Brucke iiber die Lecha, Box: Lehigh Bridge Construction,
1788-1794 (hereafter LBC 88-94); Gemein Rath Protocoll, January 8-22,1792; "ich bleibe
davon," EP #1312; MAB. Joseph Mortimer Levering, A History of Bethlehem, Bennylvama:
1741-1892, 544—46. For a biography of John Ettwein and an assessment of his sometimes
cantankerous governing style, see Hamilton,John Ettwein and the Moravian Church.
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stimvilate commerce." Christian Renatus Heckewelder, Bethlehem's
storekeeper and John's brother, pointed out that a bridge would make
life easier for his customers, as they would no longer have to hurry
back across the ferry to care for their animals, a situation which had
sometimes meant they left "without completing their business." Again
commenting from the businessman's perspective. Christian Renatus
also pointed out that the craft masters in town would be free to give
toU subsidies and discounts to their customers as an incentive to
increase business.^^
Aside from increasing commercial traffic, the bridge's proponents
saw other benefits from the project as well. It would ease the transpor
tation of stone and wood, used both for building and for fuel, and
make it easier for the Moravians to utilize fuUy their buildings and
plantations on the river's far side. Both Heckewelder brothers pointed
out that the nicest grounds for spasjerengehen, recreational walking, were
on the far side of the river. John, the missionary, saw this as a way the
bridge could be helpful to the community, while his commerciallyminded brother, a storekeeper, pointed out that such walkers would
bring in even more money to the toll coffers. John also submitted that
a bridge would help those who lived on its far side, both Moravians and
non-Moravians, when they visited Bethlehem or crossed the water to
attend church services. "It [will] also serve poor people, who by night
and poor weather must hurry to the doctor or the midwife," he added.
Summing up his support for the project,John Heckewelder simply saw
no insurmountable drawbacks: "What damage can the bridge do?" he
wrote."

"Hingegen wurdegeglaubt, dafi es in allerAbischt vortheilhaftware, wenn auf der Bau einer
Briicke uber die Lecha angetragen wiirde";"Man babe zu furchten, daC vielleicht bald einmal
eine Briicke bey Curria uber die Lecha gebaut werden wiirde, und weil jener Weg von
Philadelphia nach Wyoming so wol als nach Easton etwas naher sey, so wiirde man aller
durchgang dahier zum groBen Nachtheil aller Gewerbe in Bethlehem vollig verlieren."
ProtocoU des Aufseher Collegium,1788-1797, September 28,1791; "ich sehe es fiiir ein sehr
schones und Bethlehem nutzendes Werk an,"Jungman, Planning, LBC 88-94; "Sie machtden
Marckt beBer u. vermud. wolfeiler. Sie zieht Reisende hieher, u. belebt das commercittm."
John Heckewelder, Planning, LBC 88-94; "ohne ihre Geschafte zu voUenden"; C. R.
Heckewelder, Planning, LBC 88-94; MAB.
""So wie denen Geschwistern und Freunden diedriiben wohnen, u. bier besuchen, od. in der
Kirche wollen. Sie dient auch denen armen Leute, die bey Nacht u. Schlecht wetter zum
Docter od.den Hebammen eiligst wollen. u. dergl. mehr. Was kan aber die Briicke schaden?"
John Heckewelder, Planning, LBC 88-94; C. R. Heckewelder, LBC 88-94, MAB.
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Ettwein had raised objections to the bridge project as these
discussions had been proceeding throughout the fall of 1791, but his
protestations barely dampened the widespread enthusiasm for it.
Indeed, his protests seem forced at best. He cautioned that raising the
level of the river by building pillars in it would damage gardens on the
river's banks; he spoke of the danger of the bridge coming down in a
spring freshet because of an ice flow or a stray tree trunk; and he feared
the income lost to the town from the now-obsolete ferry would not be
replaced by tolls from the bridge. To Ettwein's frustration, however,
Bethlehem's other leaders dismissed all of his engineering objections,
apparently without much concern. They focused instead on the
financial aspects of a project that was, for them, primarily an economic
issue. They decided to pay for the bridge with private funds organi2ed
like a corporation, thereby , protecting the Bethlehem Diacony—the
financial arm of the Moravian church in Bethlehem and, as principal
employer and landowner, the core of the town's economy—from too
great a risk. They proposed to accomplish this through a "bridge
society" which would be empowered to sell shares, build and maintain
the bridge, pay the toU taker, and then distribute a profit in the form of
dividends. The Diacony would be further protected from any financial
difficulty arising from the innovation by an annual fee, paid by the
bridge society, to cover the loss of the ferry income. Eventually, wltile
Ettwein abstained from further debate, the project garnered the
approval of all three layers of Bethlehem's governing councils and went
forward in the fall of 1792."
This minor furor—the isolation of Bethlehem's most prominent
citizen and religious leader from a major decision affecting the town's
future—^was a dramatic event in the town's history and a sharp
departure from the overwhelmingly smooth process of community
governance. The mete occurrence of the discord involved in Ettwein's
withdrawal from an important decision-making process indicated that
the town had changed greatly since its early days of unity and shared
religious purpose. Although he left no clear statement on the events.

" EP #1310,1311,1312,1313;Gemein Rath ProtocoU,22January 1792; MAB. It is probable
that Joseph Horsfield, a memberof one of Bethlehem's leading families,originally devised the
plan for a bridge company, both becauseEttwein considered him the prime mover behind the
bridge, and because the earliest available document detailing the plan is in his hand.
Proposals..., LBC 88-94, MAB.
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it is possible to infer from Ettwein's flailing efforts to halt the project
that this venerable gentleman believed that something terrible was
happening to his town on his watch. He reported as much to a
colleague in Germany, writing that in Bethlehem "taking pleasure in
aping worldly things and worldly follies is a pestilence that no longer
walks in darkness." Ettwein then proceeded implicidy to connect, for
his correspondent, the economic difficulties in town and a new spirit
of decadent worldliness. "The Single Brethren's establishment is
insolvent. That a large part of our youth takes pleasure in the world
and its follies and no longer prizes simplicity and the imitation of Christ
is not to be denied."^®
Ettwein's lament epitomizes the emotional content of the
scholarly declension model: unwanted change was besetting this
religious community. The historiographical impulse to explain these
events in terms of the declension model is easy to understand. The
ingredients necessary for declension were present: a once unified
religious community now in decline amidst an economically innovative
environment. In this case, that a new bridge designed primarily to
increase commerce instigated the strife gives the declension model
added plausibility. Moreover, the 1790s, when the breach over the
bridge occurred, was a decade when traditional cotnmunities of all
kinds faced new challenges. Historians Joyce Appleby and Gordon
Wood have argued that as the democratizing effects of the American
Revolution filtered through society, Americans reevaluated their
relationships to their political leaders, their preachers, and even their
parents. The traditional bonds of deference gave way to greater
individualism and self-determination. Religious communities that had
given, in retrospect at least, an aura of stability to colonial society were
themselves weakened by the continued rise of evangelical and revivalist
religion, a movement that proceeded on a new scale as the Second
Great Awakening reached one of its first pinnacle moments at Cane
Ridge in 1801. As Nathan Hatch has argued, this era saw "common
folk not respecting their betters, organized factions speaking and
writing against civil authority, the uncoupling of church and state, and

' Quoted in Hamilton, ]ohn Ettivein and the Moravian Church, 68.
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the abandonment of setded communities in droves by people seeking
a stake in the back country."^'
Parallel to and intertwined with these cultural and religious
changes, the so-called "Market Revolution" entered onto the scene
after the Revolution in a burst of state-financed transportation projects,
newly-chartered banks,and profit-oriented corporations. Simultaneous
with these early signs of America's capitalist future, the dislocation
caused by the Revolutionary War, the disruption of trade with Britain,
ongoing currency problems, and heavy tax burdens all combined to
undermine economic stability. T^though the new nation's economy
began to rebound from postwar depression after 1787, small farmers
re^xed few benefits in the decade that followed. These two strains of
post-revolutionary change, religious democratization and economic
acceleration, are easily connected. With capitalism as the engine, the
American Revolution and the Market Revolution it begot ushered in an
era of religious pluralism and a market place of religious ideas. When
the market economy permeated the new nation, churches were no
longer the glue that held communities together, becoming instead a way
for individuals to negotiate their ever-changing worlds.^"

" Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratit(ation of American Christianity (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989), 6. The idea that the American Revolution triggered a process of widespread
democratization is hardly new, but has most recently and eloquently been articulated byjoyce
Appleby in Inheriting the involution; The FirstGeneration ofAmericans (Cambridge,Massachusetts:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000). See also Gordon S. Wood, TheKadscaiism
of the American Fevolution (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1991), especially 329-32. The rise of
evangelical religion is ably described by YWxsda^ Tiemocratictation. Jon Butler argues for the
increasing institutionalization of religious life in the early nineteenth century in Anmh in a Sea
ofFaith: ChristianisfngtheAmericanFeopie (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1990). The Cane Ridge revival is described in Paul K. Conkin's Cane FJdge:America's Pentecost
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).
Scholars of the nineteenth century have creatively addressed how religious groups
responded to new market situations. For historiographical surveys of this work, see Mark A.
Noll, editor, God and Mammon: Protestants, Monty, and the Market, 1790-1860 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 3-29; and RobertWuthnow and Tracey L. Scott, "Protestants
and Economic Behavior," in Harry S. Stout and D. G. Hart, eds.. New Directions in American
Peliffous History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 260-89. The idea of the market
revolution is most thoroughly discussed in Charles Sellers's The Market Pivolntion: Jacksordan
America, 181S-1S46 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). For more focused
investigations of the concept in the early republic, see the essays collected in Paul A. GUje,
editor. Wages oflndependence:Capitalism in the EarlpAmerican PjpubUc(Madison: Madison House,
1997). For an overview of the nation's economic fortunes in this period, see Cathy Matson,
"The Revolution, theConstitution, and the New Nation,"in Stanley L. Engerman and Robert
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At first glance, Bethlehem appears to exemplify such changes well,
and thus to invite a useful application of the declension model. Yet,
relying as it does on the appearance of social strife resulting from the
strains of economic change, such an argument rests on the assumption
that the Moravian community in Bethlehem, and in particular leaders
such as Ettwein, viewed economic innovation and growth with
hostility. In other words, if the discord of the 1790s is to be a sign of
gradual declension in the years before, one would expect to find
Moravian leaders lining up against the new market structures of the era,
for only if such change was unwelcome would "traditional" religious
communities have placed individuals in the position of choosing
between putative "old" and "new" economic paths. If religious leaders
and communities embraced the new economy and the new routes to
potential profit it offered, there would be little cause for conflict
between religious community and economic growth, and therefore little
room for the traditional explanation for declension. Consequendy, to
test whether the concept of declension can be applied in this case, it is
necessary to explore the Moravians' attitudes toward the market
economy.

A good way to interrogate whether Ettwein and other leading Moravi
ans resisted economic change—and thus ultimately to investigate the
applicability of declension—^is to look at the ways in which they had
approached economic activity in the past, specifically with respect to
those aspects of the early republic's economy that conventional wisdom
would lead us to suspect might trouble the leaders of a religious
community. The bridge project combined three specific elements that
have been heralded as hallmarks of the new market-oriented era: the

E. Gallman, editors, The Cambridge EconormcHistory of the Urtited States(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 363-401. For political turmoil and economic dislocation in Pennsyl
vania, see Paul Douglas Newman, Fries's 'Rebellion: The Enduring Struggle for the American
'Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Terry Bouton, "A Road
Closed: Rural Insurgency in Post-Independence Petinsylvania"; and Thomas P. Slaughter, The
Whiskey 'Rebellion: 'Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986).
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employment of private, profit-motivated financing; the use of a
corporate, profit-oriented structure; and the promotion of increased
commerce leading to increasingly integrated markets. A brief examina
tion of these three factors in light of traditional Moravian economic
practice, as well as Ettwein's own outlook, suggests that the bishop's
discomfort did not arise from these usual suspects, and that, as his
views were representative of the community's historic attitudes,
Bethlehem's decline cannot be laid at the feet of a purported "reU^
gious" or "Moravian" resistance to the market and the economic
changes it brought.
To begin with the most fundamental issue, it is frequentiy assumed
that the search for profits, economic individualism, and entrepreneurship are all in opposition to religious spirit. This view can be found in
the story of Robert Keayne in seventeenth-century Boston and among
some evangelicals in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As Max
Weber put it, "[t]he people filled with the spirit of capitalism to-day
tend to be indifferent, if not hostile, to the Church. The thought of the
pious boredom of paradise has ILtde attraction for their active natures,
religion appears to them as a means of drawing people away from
labour in this world." Thus, the religious person and the capitalist have
had litde, if anything, in common in the minds of most observers and
scholars. In a developed capitalist system, religion is said to put a check
on the acquisitiveness that nurtures capitalism, while the capitalist
mindset, in the words of historian Paul GUje, sees "the production of
more capital as its basic end."^^
Any dichotomy between capitalism and religious spirit is hard to
maintain when examining the Moravian community, especially at the
height of the communitarian period, however. Bethlehem had been a
profit-maximizing endeavor since its earliest days, and a steady stream
of cash was essential in order to pay for the Moravians' expensive
outreach projects. In other words, the communitarian economy
facilitated, rather than hindered, market-driven economic activity. The
Moravians emphasized artisanal work over agriculture, for example,
because it suited their religious and economic goals. The choice freed
" Robert Keayne is discussed in Bernard Bailyn's "The Apologia of Robert Keayne," WilRam
andMiuy Quarterly, 3"* Series, 7 (1950): 568-87; and in Stephen Innes's Creating the Common
wealth, 160-91. Hatch, Democratieption, 44—46; Weber, The "Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Cepitahsm, 70; and Paul A. Gilje, Wages of Independence, 7.
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most workers from the demands of seasonal labor, thus permitting
them the flexibility to follow mission calls more easily and providing
the town with a regular source of cash as it catered to the needs of an
expanding backcountry population. Bethlehem's tanners, millers, and
smiths earned a good reputation in northeastern Pennsylvania, and the
town's store served to funnel thousands of pounds of cloth, coffee,
sugar, and other items into the countryside. The church owned aU of
these shops, a fact that fundamentally differentiated Bethlehem from
other mid-Adantic towns. Community leaders and counsels governed
these businesses just as they did all other aspects of life in town.
Individual craftsmen—employees, rather than the small businessmen
one associates with artisanal work—^had both greater security and less
freedom than their counterparts in other towns. The deeper pockets
of the Moravian church smoothed over difficult years for some
artisans, while others found their shops closed and themselves
reassigned when a business was deemed no longer appropriate 6r
profitable. This was, in short, a religious society using Pennsylvania's
nascent consumer economy to finance its religious work; preaching to
the unconverted was its mission, and capitalism was its method for
reaching that goal.^
Private capital, too, was essential to maintaining Bethlehem's
economic system and insxoring that the communal household turned a
profit. Wealthy New York merchant and devoted Moravian Henry
Van Vleck was fold as much when his request to move to Bethlehem
was denied in the late 1740s because the community needed his
professional skills in New York. Later, during the Seven Years War,
during which Moravians suffered both in Pennsylvania and in Saxony,
Bishop Joseph Spangenberg, Ettwein's predecessor as Bethlehem's
head, worked to instill values of charity in the Moravians (both inside
and outside of Bethlehem), teaching them to put aside a bit each week
for the needs of a financially overextended international Moravian
church, rather than be hit with a big sum at the end of the year. This

^ Engel, "Of Heaven and Earh," chapter 1. Although the presumed opposition between
wealth and religiosity have persisted to the present, scholars of the nineteenth century have
also emphasized the ways in which Protestant ministers helped their congregants to reconcile
entrepreneurial efforts and piety. See, for example, Richard W. Pointer, "Philadelphia
Presbyterians, Capitalism, and the Morality of Economic Success," in Mark A. Noll, ed., God
and Mammon,171-91.
I
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"Sympathy Fiind" is even more striking considering that it was
instituted during Bethlehem's communal period, when residents
received no cash wages. Furthermore, after the transition to a marketbased system, Bethlehem's leaders used the profit motive as a way to
encourage healthy business in town, giving some craftsmen a percent
age of their industry's annual profit. By protecting private property,
nurturing ideas of charity, and supporting the growth of personal
wealth within Bethlehem, the Moravians had long endorsed the role of
private initiative and profit in Bethlehem's religious work; indeed, the
production of capital was critical to Bethlehem's ability to support its
missionaries. Throughout the eighteenth century, the town's leaders
encoviraged, rather than hindered, privately-funded and profit-moti
vated economic behavior, suggesting that the strife of the 1790s could
not have come from that source.^
There was, of course, a difference between the capitalism of the
1740s and that of the 1790s, and it is certainly possible that Ettwein
objected to the bridge because of its relatively innovative corporatestyle financing, the second of our three suspects. Historians have
frequently pointed to the extension of corporate privileges as one of
the signs that the "market revolution" was taking hold. After the
dislocation and depression of the Revolutionary era, increased state
support for private initiative in the 1790s led to an explosion of new
banks, transportation projects, and a steadily increasing (though still
small) number of for-profit corporations. This evolution marked a
shift from preserving the privileges of corporate status for those who
served the community, such as churches and universities, to extending
those privileges to those serving the market by building roads and
providing financing. The invigorated national mood of the 1790s was
" Henry Van Vleck Lebenslauf; Mideidenheit: Box: Economy Period, Folder Letters from
Europe toBethlehem, Circular letters dated 17 October 1759, and December 5,1759; see also
Spangenberg Collection, Box 1, folder Sp A V, Circular letter, 23 July 1760. For wages in
economic transition, see loose documents in Box: Transition Period (From Economy to
Committee System) 1761-1773;MAB. ForfurtherdiscussionofMoravianeconomic thought,
see, in addition to theworks on Bethlehem liste above, Peter Vogt, "Des Heilands Okonomie:
Wirtschaftethik bei Zinzendorf," Umtas Fratnm, 49-50 (2002), 157-72; Phillipp Guntram,
"Wirtschaftethik und Wirtschaftspraxis in det Geschichte der Herrnhuter Briidergemeine,"
in Mari P. Van Buijtenen, et alii, XJmtasI^atmii: Herrnhuter StuMen!Moravian Studies (Utrecht
Rijksarchief, 1975), 401-63; and Otto Uttendorfer, Alt-Hermhut: WirthschaftsgescUchte und
V^UffonssKQoloffe vahrend seiner erstentjv^nsjgjahre (1722-1742)(Hermhut Missionsbuchhandlung, 1925).
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not lost on the Moravians, who worried that if the bridge project was
not begun soon, "at this time when the Spirit of Improvements in the
land is so great," they might lose their opportunity.^'*
Any assumption that Ettwein objected to the bridge project
because of its corporate-style financing, however, can be laid to rest
quickly. The Moravians had an extensive history of combining
religious and commercial ventures of this nature. In the 1750s, leaders
in Herrnhut founded the Brethrens Commercial Society, a joint-stock
company made up of Moravian merchants who used the church's welldeveloped information network (resulting from the group's extensive
missions to enslaved Africans) in the profitable West Indian colonies
to turn a tidy profit. A sixeable portion of that profit went into the
coffers of the Mission Department in Europe, bringing the project full
circle.^® Though Ettwein himself had not invested in the Commercial
Society, he certainly had experience with the corporate-style financing
it employed. Indeed, if the bridge's proponents were comfortable with
the corporate structure they used to finance the venture, Ettwein could
take the credit as much as his colleagues in Germany. In 1788, the
bishop had eagerly pursued achieving such status for a new Moravian
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG) in America, following
a model already in use in Britain. He felt that such an arrangement
would give added legal standing and credibility to the Moravian
missionary efforts and would help the Moravians obtain a tract of land
in Ohio from the federal government for their beleaguered Indian
congregations. Moreover, limiting the membership to Moravians (and
ensuring that the Society's directors overlapped with Bethlehem's
leaders) guaranteed that no rift would develop between the new SPG
and the Moravian church. After the SPG received a Pennsylvania

"Wenn man zu diesei Zeit da der Spirit of Improvements im Lande so gtoB sey, nicht drauf
antriige bald eine Act zu kriegen, es in wenigjahren sehr erschwert werden konte..." Protocol!
des Aufseher Collegium, 5 October 1791, MAB. See also Sellers, Market Solution, 41-47;
John Lauritz Larson, Internal Improvement: National Public IPirks and the Promise of Popular
Government in the Earfy United States (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001);
Pauline Maier, "The Revolutionary Origins of theAmerican Corporation," WilBam and Maty
Quarterly, 3"* Series, 50 (1993): 51-84; and Oscar Handlin and Mary R Handlin, "Origins of
the American Business Corpoauon," Journal of Economic Histoy S (1945): 1-23.
" For records of the Commercial Society's founding, see Unitatsvorsteherkollegium (UVC)
records, I 44, Unitatsarchiv, Herrnhut (hereafter UAH).
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chartet, Ettwein then worked to get similar instruments from New
Jersey and New York.^*^
The SPG and the Bridge Society to which Ettwein objected had
much in common. The articles governing each society spelled out a
basic structure, including a governing board with its seat in Bethlehem.
Both groups Umited their membership to Moravians (although stock
from the Bridge Society could be inherited by a non-Moravian), and
both sets of articles ensured that Bethlehem's leaders would not lose
any significant power over the accumulated funds or the projects they
were meant to finance. The directors of the SPG were limited to
"those Brethren, who are appointed to be directors of the Brethren's
congregations in North America"; the director of the Bridge Society
was the "Gemein Vorsteher" Bethlehem's administrative overseer,
invariably a member of the church. Beyond these structural similarities,
there was the simple fact that the same people participated in the two
endeavors. Nineteen of the twenty-four men who initially joined the
Bridge Society in 1792 were also members of theSPG; three years later,
eighteen of the twenty-three male shareholders in the bridge project
were members of the SPG. Furthermore, as the congregation itself
owned nearly 30 per cent of the Bridge Society's stock, there was litde
chance of the Bridge Society and the congregation butting hea.ds. In
short, with the SPG in mind, the Bridge Society represented virtually
no innovation for Bethlehem's economy, and it is doubtful that this bit
of modern private financing could have accounted for Ettwein s
discomfort.^^
^ HamatonJflAw Ettmein, 114-20. "An ACT to incotporate the society for propagating the
Gospel among the Heathen, formed by members of the Episcopal Church of the United
Brethren or Unitas Fratrum," haws Enacted in the Second Sitting of the Twelfth GeneralAssemhlj/ of
the Commonwealth ofPenn^lvania, Which commenced at Philadelphia, on Tues^,the nineteenth Diff of
February, in the Year of our Lord, One thousand and seven hundred and eightji-seven.
" "Stated Rules of the Society of the United Brethren for Propagating the Gospel among the
Heathen," SPG Collection, Series II, Box 1, Folder 2; List of Members of the SPG, SPG
Collection, Series II, Box 1, Folder 4; "Artickel in welchen die dazu unterschriebenen
Personen..." LBC, Founding, Minutes,1792-1827, Folder; Plan to Form the Company; LBC
Ledger, 1792-1827, folio 9; MAB. Although the Bridge Society was, in effect, a corporation,
the grant approving the bridge from the Pennsylvania Assembly made no mention of the
society. Instead, the Gemein VorsteherJohn Schropp was given the right to build the bridge
and the responsibility for it The Bridge Society was legally incorporated in 1827. "An Act
for establishing and building a bridge across the river Lehigh, at Bethlehem, in the covmty of
'tioiHamiptoaf Alts ofthe GeneralAssembly ofthe CommonwealthofPennylvania,Passed at aSession,
Which was begun and Held at the City of Philadeftshia on Tuesday, the Twenty-Third, in the Year One
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The declension model does not rest on such a narrow criterion as
the advent of corporations, however. Quite the contrary, the broad
and pervasive effects of declining insularity and increasingly pernicious
worldly influences caused by improved commercial communication
offer a third possibility for why Ettwein might have objected to the
bridge. As the market economy of the early republic developed,
farmers and trades people made use of new transportation networks to
sell their goods. As "market places" turned into "market economies,"
to paraphrase Winifred Rothenberg, it became harder for communities
to remain isolated, either socially or economically. While the Moravi
ans in Bethlehem had always made their money off of commerce with
their neighbors, the town remained a closed religious community that
carefully controlled access by "strangers," so the supposition that
increased contact with the outside world in some way contaminated
Bethlehem's communal sensibility is potentially a valid one.^
In Ettwein's case, however, the idea that this innovation worried
him is as difficult to sustain as his proposed objection to a corporation.
His interest in affairs outside of Bethlehem was deep and significant,
while his incessant travels often brought him into contact with public
officials and governmental affairs. He followed newspapers from

Thousand, Seven Hundred and Ninely-One, and of the Independence of the United States of America, the
(Philadelphia: 1791). CoimLA'&atA,ADi^est of CorporationsChartered^ theLep^lature
of Pennp/lvania Between the Years 1700 and 1873 Inclusive, Second and Revised Edirion
(Philadelphia: John Campbell and Sons, 1874), 136. Pennsylvania Law P.L. 133,27 March
1827.
Winifred Rothenberg, From Market Places to a Market Fconorny: The Tranformation ofBural
Massachusetts, 1750-1850 (Chicago:University ofChicago Press, 1992). The timing and nature
of early America's capitalist transformation is still debated. Naomi R. Lamoreaux has argued
for a conception of the transition that does not hinge on rational or "moral economy"
behavior, but still embraces a basic transition in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. "Rethinking the Transition to Capitalism in the Early American Northeast."
Richard Bushman has asserted that farmers in the mid-Atlantic region combined marketand
subsistence farmingduring the eighteenth century, thus arguing against a clearshift. "Markets
and Composite Farms in Early America," William and MatyQuarterlf, 3rd Series, 55 (1998):
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trade in the same region. "Farmers and Dry Goods in the Philadelphia Market Area,
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atound the colonies and from Germany, and he kept records of articles
that interested him. He collected information on the national imports
and exports of various countries, particularly England, a habit that
suggests he understood how the far-flung markets of the Adantic
economy affected each other. After the Revolution, he wrote a
proposal to handle the national debt through a lottery system that
would gradually pull in outstanding notes. His countless "memoranda"
and lively correspondence paint a picture of a man engaged in his
times, not one seeking to isolate his town from the growing web of
market connections. Although such a thorough record is not available
for all Moravians, it is at least clear that the bridge's proponents
universally mentioned their hopes that the bridge would increase
commerce (and,in a few cases, mentioned that it might increase church
attendance). Moreover, the exuberant missionary work that had
animated the town since its founding necessitated constant communi
cation and exchange with non-Moravians. All in all, it seems unlikely
that anyone in Bethlehem in 1792 was concerned about the bridge
radically changing the town's relationship to the broader world.
Given the evidence of the Moravians' (and Ettwein's) financially
acute and market-oriented behavior, it is therefore difficult to sustain
as reasons for Ettwein's objections to the bridge the three most
obvious innovations of the early republic's market capitalism repre
sented by the bridge project: the perception that the use of private
capital was detrimental to traditional religious commionity, the profitoriented corporation, and increased contact with outsiders in long
distance markets. The Moravians in general and Ettwein in particular
would not have stumbled over these hurdles. Yet, in the midst of what
seems to have been almost universal support for the bridge. Bishop
Ettwein stood against the project.
Perhaps the answer to this conundrum lies less in the bishop s
economic thought than in his personal circumstances at the time of the
crisis. When the bridge was proposed,John Ettwein was seventy years
old. He had watched and participated in Moravian projects in America
for almost a half-century, mostly in positions of leadership and
authority. Although he would live for another decade, his autobiogra-

John Ettwein Lebenslauf; HP #1503,1505, MAS. See Ettwein Collection Catalog for a
fuller list of Ettwein's memoranda.
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phy ceased to record events after 1791—^a clear signal that he felt his
life's main work was done. In Ettwein's final appeals against the
bridge, he asked that at the very least the project be postponed for
three years. His opponents countered, understandably, that the delay
wohld make no difference to any of the issues then on the table
(specifically, the technical difficulties of the bridge and the profitability
of the ferry versus a toll bridge). When they overruled him, what they
perhaps did not see, or at least did not record, was an old man's
discomfort at the pace of change in the early republic.^" On 22 January
1792, the Gemein Rath gave its approval to the project. Governor
Thomas Mifflin signed an Act of Assembly authorizing a toU bridge on
April 3 of that year. Two months later, on 1June 1792, the first formal
list of subscribers to the Bridge Society was drawn up, with the
Bethlehem Diacony holding fifteen of the original fifty portions. The
bridge was finally completed in September 1794 at a cost of $7,800.
Shordy thereafter, stock in the company was distributed in $100 shares,
with the Diacony now owning twenty-four, or nearly a third of the
bridge. In the early republic, therefore, despite some hesitation on the
part of its agingleader, the Moravian church continued, as it had during
the colonial era, to take advantage of economic opportunities and to
combine private initiative and church fortunes.^'
Ettwein's frustration over the bridge project, inconsistent as it may
seem, crystallizes the importance and durability of declension, the
unwanted ebb in religious cohesion and energy, for understanding
religious community despite dispensing with the causal economic
argument behind the model. It is impossible to dispute Bethlehem's
decline in the 1790s or to ignore Ettwein's negative assessment of that
change. Who could blame him? Measured against the standard of its
own early decades, Bethlehem indisputably waned in the period after
the Revolutionary War. Its population shrank, and discord erupted
between leaders and citizens, between young and old. New projects of
the kind that characterized the 1740s and 1750s, such as planting the
Wachovia tract or sending out dozens of missionaries each year, had
been replaced by efforts to salvage what little economic health
remained in the town. In short, the problem of decline remains, even

John Ettwein Lebenslauf, MAB.
" Gemein Rath Protocol!, 22January 1792, Lehigh Bridge Corporation Ledger, MAB.
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without the ready explanation offered by declension. If, however, one
reframes the question, leaving aside the issue of how the Moravians
responded to economic change and the abolition of communalism as
a market event, and asks instead the simpler question of what had
changed in Bethlehem between roughly 1755 and 1785, a simpler
answer than the corrosive-though-invisible influence of capitalism
emerges, one which scholars predisposed to accept the economic
declension model have hitherto overlooked. It was not the Moravians'
relationship to the economy that changed, but the nature of their
central mission.

As mentioned above, Moravian work among Pennsylvania s Native
peoples began almost immediately after they arrived in the province.
Over time, work among the Indians had come to overshadow Zinzendorf s plan of organizing German-American Christians, which had been
met by stiff resistance in the colony. Despite this reorientation,
support for the missions, both religious and economic, had provided
Bethlehem with its sense of purpose and had distinguished the
community from neighboring Pennsylvania towns and even other
Moravian towns. Early efforts were quite successful, and by the
outbreak of the French and Indian War, missionaries had baptized
hundreds of Indians. The start of the war, however, signaled a
permanent change in the circumstances of that work. After 1755,
established missions disappeared in waves of violence and antagonism,
and new, ultimately temporary settlements grew up in their place. The
first hint of trouble came shortly after the start of the war, in late
October 1755, when Indian raids on Penn's Creek forced the mission
aries at Shamokin to flee the Susquehanna Valley. Just a month later,
a raid on the nearby mission at Gnadenhiitten sent Moravian Indians
and their missionaries back to Bethlehem in fear. Over the next year,
the frontier contracted to Bethlehem, and the town became a safe
haven for both white refugees and Christian Indians. Ironically, the
massacre protected the Moravians briefly from suspicions on the part
of their white neighbors of complicity with the French, though their
widespread work with Native peoples in preceding decades made it
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impossible to prevent at least a few Indians with Moravian connections
from going over to the enemy side.'^
; During the nrat few years, Bethlehem's mission work centered on
the newly built and nearby towns of Nain and Weequetank, which lay
outside Bethlehem and Nazareth, respectively. Their congregations
included many Indians who had already fled both Shecomeco and
Gnadenhiitten. As Pennsylvania's leaders worked to come to peace
with the Native peoples of the region, the Lehigh Valley became a
crossroads for hundreds of travelers. Many Indians came to participate
in or to support those attending the treaty talks at Easton, and some
made new homes in the Moravian mission towns. For two years,
Bethlehem's residents struggled to handle the steady stream of visitors,
along with the Indian congregations who were by then almost totally
dependent on the Moravians for support. Over time, the sympathy
brought about by the Gnadenhiitten massacre wore away, and though
church leaders worked in conjunction with the Pennsylvania authori
ties, the Moravians' compliance did not protect the town from the
anger of its neighbors, who distrusted the Moravians intensely for their
ongoing connections with Indians.^^
, Despite the animosity they aroused from European-Americans,
the Moravians' experiences during the French and Indian War must
have served to reinforce daily in the minds of Bethlehem's residents
that the town's first purpose had been to serve as a base for missionary
work. The results of that work—^positive in the form of baptized and
communicant Indians, negative in the form of the Gnadenhiitten
massacre and angry threats from white neighbors—^verily surrounded
them. Personal mission experience also pervaded the community,
weaving a fabric of work and faith throughout the town. During
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William C. Reichel, Memorials of the Moravian Church (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott &
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Bethlehem's first decades nearly a third of the adult men had worked
in the religious field in one way or another, usually with their spouses,
while those remaining in town supported the travelers. Between 1755
and 1763, the level of psychological engagement with the missions may
have even increased due to the traumas of frontier war. Everyone saw,
personally and direcdy, the fruits of their labors.^"*
The immediate Indian presence in and around Bethlehem ended,
as did the personal experiences of many Moravians with the mission
work their community supported, suddenly, in November 1763. In the
face of heightened interracial violence related to Pontiac's War,
Pennsylvania's officials took steps to secure the safety of Indians within
the setded areas, including the congregations at Nain and Weequetank,
effectively acknowledging their inability to control their own popula
tion. On November 5, 1763, word reached Bethlehem that the 121
Indians living in those places must remove to Philadelphia for their
own protection. According to Bernard Grube, one of the missionaries
assigned to the congregation, the "fury of the people" whom the group
encountered when they reached the capital was "indescribable. He
and the Indians he escorted "had to stand in front of the barracks for
fuUy three hours and take all kinds of disgrace and scorn" before they
were finally ushered to a safe house on Province Island, at the
confluence of the Delaware and Schuylkill Rivers.^^ After an abortive
attempt to transport the Indians to New York (called off just as the
group tried to cross into New York at Amboy), Governor John Penn
lodged them in the Philadelphia barracks, where they waited out the
conflict until the spring of 1765, losing almost half their number to
smallpox and dysentery along the way.'^
For levds of missionary participation among the Moravians, see Engel, "Of Heaven and
Earth," chapter 5 and appendix.
"Die Wuth der Leute in Philadelphia war unbeschreiblich und wir musten so wohl bey 3
Stunden vor den Barracks stehen u. alle Schmach und Spott einnehmen." Bethlehem Diary,
16 November 1763, MAB.
^ For the "Philadelphia Congregation,"as the Indians imprisoned there were known,see Box
127, Missionary Records, MAB. See also Daniel K. Richter, FacingEastfrom Indian County: A.
Native Histoty of Earfy America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001),
189-236; Krista Camenzind, 'Wiolence, Race, and the Paxton Boys," in William A. Pencak
and Daniel K. Richter, editors.Friends citr Enemies inVenn's Woods, 201-20;and Gregory Evans
Dowd, War Under Heaven: PonUac, the Indian Nations, & the British Empire (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 174-212. See also Brooke Hindle, "The March of the
Paxton Boys," William and MaryQuarterly, 3rd Series, 3 (1946), 461-86; and John R. Dunbar,
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In April 1765, the Indians in Philadelphia received permission to
travel north to a new settlement at Wyalusing, along the northern
branch of the Susquehanna River. The town they established,
Friedenshiitteo (tents of peace) proved one of the most successful of
this era of mission work, due in no small part to David Zeisberger, one
of the Moravians' most prominent evangelists. Unfortunately for the
Indians, however, the towns established in the late 1760s were all short
lived, as both encroaching white settlement and continued Iroquois
hegemony over the Native peoples of the area forced the Christianized
Delaware to move farther west. By the early 1770s, Friedenshiitten and
a series of small missions on the Allegheny River had all been aban
doned in favor of new settlements in Ohio. Those villages (including
another doomed Gnadenhiitten, though this one feU at the hands of
white setders rather than hostile Indians) survived until the end of the
Revolutionary War, when they too were abandoned, and Moravian
missionaries again followed their congregations farther from American
settlement. Because of both open violence and consistent animosity,
the Native peoples considered so vital to Bethlehem's initial and central
religious mission were on the move.^'
As the North American mission congregations drifted and fled
farther from daily contact with Bethlehem, unrelated developments in
international Moravian mission policy removed another key connection
to the church's religious outreach. The Biiidergemin^s first outreach
efforts, in 1733, had been to the Danish West Indies. By the 1760s, the
missions there, particularly on St. Thomas, had grown to encompass
thousands of souls. That place, and the other missions at St. Kitts, St.
John, Jamaica, and Surinam, required a small army of religious workers
to keep them afloat. Since Bethlehem's founding, leaders there had
administered the island congregations by filling vacant positions,
ensuring that the posts had basic supplies, and circulatingletters, diaries
and news between Europe and the missions. When workers posted to
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St. Thomas needed respite, or needed to send their children to school,
they returned to Bethlehem.
The enormous Caribbean missions placed Pennsylvania Moravians
in a privileged position vis a vis the church's wider goals. All this
changed on 10 April 1764, when the Enge Confermt^ the body in
Herrnhut charged with reorganizing the Briidergemeine in the wake of
Zinzendorf s death, decided that Herrnhut would administer the West
Indian missions direcdy. This decision not only removed power from
Bethlehem's leaders, it cut nearly all the direct lines of information
from the town to the missions. "In the future, therefore, the diaries as
well as the reports from all brothers and sisters in the West Indian
Islands will only be sent to Europe," the conference reported, adding
that "resolutions will also go out from here directly to the West Indian
Islands, without being first communicated to Pennsylvania."
The cumulative effect of these events on Bethlehem was great.
Only ten years after the Nain and Weequetank congregations left ^e
community's immediate care, hundreds of miles and mountains
separated Bethlehem from its nearest Indian missions. Although those
missions continued to be an important part of Moravian life, the
connections between mission base and post became far more attenu
ated. The daily comings and goings of missionaries. Native peoples,
and baptized Indians ground almost to a halt. Meanwhile, Bethlehem
found itself demoted from the principal Moravian center for mission
administration, an extensive network of converts, to little more than a
distant religious enclave. When the effects of this administrative
decision combined with the migration of Nor th American Indians away
from eastern Pennsylvania, the town was, over the course of just a few
short years, transformed from a missionary center to a quiet backcountry town, differentiated from its neighbors in ever fewer ways.
The end of Bethlehem's years as a mission base neatly coincides
with the end of the communal period in 1761. The putative drama of
the latter transition, however, has obscured the importance of the
former. Historians emphasizing the uniqueness of the communal

^ "Es werden also kunftig, so wohl die Diana als berichten, von alien geschw.' auf den West
Indischen hlandennur nach Europa geschickt";"Die resolutiones'fietAexiauch von hier aus dirict,
ohne sie erst mit Pensilvamen zu commmiciren, nach den W Indischen Isknden abgehen." M.
Dep. I.l, p. 26, "An die Americanische Oeconomats Conferenz, April 26,1764"; see also
Enge Conferenz ProtokoUe, April 10,1764, UAH.
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venture have found it easy to believe that the insertion of market
relations into a religious enclave would have hastened that onslaught of
"worldliness" that Ettwein moxirned three decades later, thus opening
the door for the idea of declension. The missions around which life in
Bethlehem revolved have all but dropped explanations of life within the
town. Bringing them back into the picture makes it easier to under
stand Bethlehem's loss of purpose and focus without resort to any
specific "model."

Tying religious declension to the growth of capitalism obscures the
subde relationship between religious and economic culture. For
residents of the early republic, the dislocations of the 1790s came from
many sources; from new and xxnwelcome taxation, from the often
painful sorting out of winners and losers in a new economic era, and
from widespread questioning of the very nature of political and social
authority. In this morass, the temptation for those who look at
economic change is to place the engine of capitalism at the causal
center of this whirlwind. Bethlehem's example suggests that this needs
to be done cautiously. That there was discomfort and decline within
the community does not mean thatconflict between religious belief and
capitalism was the sole, or even primary, cause.
Bethlehem waned when it lost its missions, not when it changed
its economy or met the changes of the "market revolution." The clear
animating vision engendered by missionarywork had brought hvindreds
of individuals into a common endeavor and had given life to what had
been a strikingly devout and unified community. The decline evident
in the 1790s did not come from the axiomatic and foreordained
influence of macro-historical forces. Quite the contrary, Bethlehem's
fortunes ebbed because of smaller, more particular circumstances, most
of which had nothing to do with the piety or community cohesion of
those in town. The Moravians had been drawn to Pennsylvania
because of the powerful desire to bring the word of God to Native
peoples, but the society that developed in Pennsylvania during the
eighteenth century would not permit sustained or intimate contact
between whites and Indians. Church leaders in Germany streamlined
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international mission organization, not realizing that they would
deprive one of their principal towns of a key component of its religious
life. Other, less dramatic developments followed. The years of the
Revolutionary War made contact between Europe and America
difficult and erratic, for example, severing Bethlehem from the larger
whole of which it had always been a part, while the passing of Bethle
hem's first generation exposed the community to the problems of
maturation that all zealous movements face. Decline as a result of the
passage of time, as well as shifts in the racial and political geography of
the Atlantic world cannot be ignored, but neither should it be explained
away as part of transhistorical assumptions about the corrosive effects
of market economies on religious community.
The declension model has suppUed us, for decades, with a clean
explanation for why religious communities ebb. Its geographical and
chronological flexibility (when has the American economy not been in
a state of change and transition?) has allowed the idea to persist despite
the recognition that New England, at least, experienced a much more
complicated evolution in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than
any one model could explain. Bethlehem's story points to two
conclusions. First, positing a negative relationship between religious
communities and economic growth is misleading at best. This is as true
in the eighteenth century as it would be in the nineteenth or twentieth
centuries. Moravian business and spiritual leaders were able to harness
market forces for the community's benefit, and they saw no contradic
tion in doing so. Removing the shield of declension from the study of
religion and economic life in this period wiU permit other such
complicated negotiations to come to light. Second, and perhaps even
more important, is the suggestion that decline can exist without the
declension model. Disproving the causal dynamic at its heart should
not mean avoiding the evidence that suggested its application in the
first place.
On the whole, Ettwein has not fared very well in this story. A
tired old man, widowed, displaced by changes in his home and in his
life's work, venerated but no longer obeyed, he appears almost pathetic.
Two final notes, however, must be added to the story of the Lehigh
Bridge by way of conclusion. In 1798, when John C. Ogden traveled
to Bethlehem to write about the wonders of this religious community,
he devoted pages to Ettwein, but only wrote in passing that "the bridge
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across the Lehigh, being out of repair, it was needful to pass the ford,
which is safe and easy." Clearly, for all that the bridge had been
heralded by its proponents, it was not the panacea they had hoped for.
Finally, Ettwein, who died in 1802, could have had the last laugh of
all—^if that was his nature—^when the bridge came down in a spring
freshet in 1815, proving that his technical concerns had been well
placed after all.^'

" John C. Ogden, An Excmion into Bethlehem eb" Nazareth in Penn^Imnia in the Year 1799
(Philadelphia; Charles Cist,1805), 6. IjfveaDg, A History of Bethlehem, hAh-A(>.

